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ABSTRACT 
Section 6002 of the Affordable Care Act, also known as the “Sunshine Act,” was 
intended to stop corrupt practices within the medical community by requiring phar-
maceutical and medical device manufacturers to disclose all transfers of value of a 
certain amount made between them and physicians. This article suggests that the 
































                                                          
* B.A., Columbia College, Columbia, Missouri 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2019. Special thanks to Benjamin Kweskin for his helpful feedback and editorial input on this 
article. 
1
Tiller: Getting Their Fix: Doctor's Dependency on Big Pharma
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
Iss. 2] Tiller: Getting Their Fix 493 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Though the doctors treated him, let his blood, and gave him medications 
to drink, he nevertheless recovered.”1 
Much has changed in the medical world since Leo Tolstoy made his wry com-
ment concerning 19th century doctors’ attempts to treat their patients. One aspect 
that has remained the same, however, is the patient’s reliance on doctors to heal 
them. Their reliance is understandable, not only because doctors undergo years of 
strenuous training to acquire a degree of expertise unavailable to the general public, 
but also because people visit doctors in stressful situations when they are physically 
sick and in a vulnerable emotional state.2 Patients rely on medical professionals to 
cure whatever ails them in a manner that puts the patient’s needs first.3 A patient’s 
faith is often rewarded as doctors are able to make urgent decisions without the need 
for constant consultations with their patient; however, allowing doctors to make 
unilateral decisions also leaves patients open to exploitation. 
When a doctor is faced with deciding between two options, one of which will 
benefit the patient and one which will benefit themselves, many doctors choose the 
latter.4 Financial conflicts of interest can have the “greatest potential to create ten-
sion” with the patient’s care, as the conflict can create a “harmful influence” on the 
doctor’s professional judgment.5 For instance, imagine that in Tolstoy’s scenario, 
whoever made the medication also paid for the doctor’s lunch while pitching the 
drug to him. In addition, what if there was an equally effective and much cheaper 
medication available, but because that other manufacturer did not pay for the doc-
tor’s lunch, the physician chose the more expensive medicine instead? Sadly, this 
scenario is not a work of fiction; this is the state of the medical world today.6 
Despite the passage of recent regulatory laws, such as the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Act”),7 the relationship between doctors, pa-
tients, pharmaceutical companies, and medical device manufacturers (“Big 
Pharma”), remains open to abuse. Doctors are incentivized to use certain rugs over 
others and to order various tests and methods of treatment—even when they are not 
medically necessary.8 Enabling this unprincipled practice is the fact that doctors are 
neither required to disclose potential conflicts of interest to their patients, nor to the 
federal government. Instead, under the section of the Act that governs this issue—
                                                          
 1. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1102 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Vintage 
Classics 2005) (1869). 
 2. Alexandros Stamatoglou, The Physician Payment Sunshine Act: An Important First Step in Miti-
gating Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medical and Clinical Practice, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 
967 (2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Roy H. Perlis & Clifford S. Perlis, Physician Payments from Industry Are Associated with Greater 
Medicare Part D Prescribing Costs, 11(5) PLᴏS ONE 1 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ar-
ticles/PMC4868346/. 
 5. Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Con-
ducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 45, 56 (2004). 
 6. See generally Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as they Pitch, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28lunch.html. 
 7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. 
 8. Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, The Little Red Pill Being Pushed on the Elderly: CNN Investigation 
Exposes Inappropriate Use of Drug in Nursing Homes, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/12/health/nuedexta-nursing-homes-invs/index.html (last updated Oct. 12, 
2017, 5:51 PM). 
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§ 6002, often called the Sunshine provision—the government only requires “cer-
tain” pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers to report certain 
payments of value that they make to doctors, including the names of any doctors 
that have invested in their companies.9 These reports are later published in the 
online database, Open Payments, where patients can search to determine whether 
there is a possible conflict of interest between their doctors and the medications they 
prescribe to their patients.10 
Furthermore, the Act only requires disclosure if the products and devices are 
covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(“CHIP”).11 There are other federal laws that regulate certain aspects of physician 
behavior, such as the Stark law, which “[p]rohibits a physician from making refer-
rals for certain designated health services (DHS) payable by Medicare to an entity 
with which he or she (or an immediate family member) has a financial relation-
ship.”12 But Stark is narrow in focus and contains several exceptions,13 leaving it 
open to exploitation as well. Indeed, when the Act was first introduced, it was con-
sidered to “break new ground” because it both “supplements and goes far beyond 
existing law in terms of which payment information will get collected and publicly 
reported,”14 although it also has several loopholes. Moreover, Big Pharma is not the 
only player ferreting ways to game the system; smaller players in the medical in-
dustry have also exploited the loopholes present in medical regulations.15 
Conflicts of interest between doctors and patients are not a problem unique to 
America. Some countries have imitated the United States’ solution by enacting their 
own “Sunshine” laws.16 Other countries have dealt with the problem in their own 
way, such as requiring doctors to disclose to their respective governments any pay-
ments they receive, and then releasing that information to the public.17 These dis-
closure laws are relatively new, however, and determining their effects is difficult 
at this time. Yet, disclosure laws alone, as they currently stand, are not enough to 
encourage doctors to place their patients’ needs ahead of their own. Until now, leg-
islation has focused on regulating Big Pharma, but focus should shift to the other 
party in the relationship—the physician. This article puts forth the proposal that the 
United States Federal Government must ban certain transactions between physi-
cians and those involved in the medical industry entirely in the hopes of finally 
putting the patient’s interests first. 
                                                          
 9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 6002 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7h (2013)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Physician Self Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medi-
care/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/index.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015, 10:59 AM); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b). 
 14. Richard S. Saver, Shadows Amid Sunshine: Regulating Financial Conflicts in Medical Research, 
145 CHEST 379, 380–81 (2014). 
 15. Ellis & Hicken, supra note 8. 
 16. Moya Ball, Shining the Light on Fundamental Flaws in Global Healthcare Sunshine Laws, and a 
Proposal for Patient-Focused Transparency, 28(5) HEALTH LAW. 1, 7 (2016). 
 17. Id. 
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II. THE SYMPTOMS 
In the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st, the relationship between 
Big Pharma and physicians grew increasingly intertwined.18 Pharmaceutical com-
panies developed drugs to treat various illnesses and injuries,19 which doctors then 
prescribed to their sick patients. But, with several companies making similar prod-
ucts to compete for the same patients,20 each company needed to develop a strategy 
to get doctors to prescribe their drugs—and only their drugs. To do that, they tried 
to seduce doctors by giving them “gifts” in the hope of turning their heads.21 As 
each company tried to outdo the other, the gifts grew in value until they included 
everything from “pens, notepads and pizza to watches, golf trips and five star dining 
[experiences].”22 
In the late 1980s, alarming information about the relationship between Big 
Pharma and physicians began to surface that revealed “kickbacks, fraud, and other-
wise shady dealings” between the two parties.23 Physicians engaged in “self-refer-
rals,” which is a type of kickback where the physician owns a stake in whatever 
medical service he or she refers to a patient.24 This development generated a great 
deal of concern over possible corruption and bribery, prompting many legislators 
to enact regulations, like the Stark Law, to rein in some of the more heavy-handed 
practices.25 But, once these particular “shady dealings” were curtailed, others took 
their place. 
As competition increased within the industry, pharmaceutical companies began 
sponsoring continuing medical education courses (“CME”),26 that provided doctors 
with rebates for each dose of the company’s drug they prescribed,27 and funding for 
their research projects.28 As fears of corruption mounted across the nation, regula-
tions were passed on a state by state basis. Vermont, one such state, was the first to 
                                                          
 18. Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle - An Analysis of the Prohibition on Physi-
cian Self-Referrals, 27 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
 19. Franco Malerba & Luigi Orsenigo, Innovation and Market Structure in the Dynamics of the Phar-
maceutical Industry and Biotechnology: Towards a History Friendly Model, 11(4) INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 667, 674–75 (2002). 
 20. Id. at 675. 
 21. Scott Velasquez, There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch: A Look at State Gift Disclosure 
Laws and the Effect on Pharmaceutical Company Marketing, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 563–64 
(2008). 
 22. Emily Clayton, ‘Tis Always the Season for Giving: A White Paper on the Practice and Problems 
of Pharmaceutical Detailing, CALPIRG 3 (2004), https://calpirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Tisthe-
SeasonForGiving04.pdf. 
 23. Wales, supra note 18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the Funding Effect in Science: What’s Beyond Transparency?, 21 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 112 (2010). 
 27. Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Doctors Reap Millions for Anemia Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (May 
9, 2007) (noting that the doctors were working around the federal ban on pharmaceutical companies 
paying doctors to prescribe certain drugs by having them administer the intravenous drugs in the hospi-
tal). See generally Gardiner Harris & Janet Roberts, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers on Close View, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/21drug.html (“Research shows that 
doctors who have close relationships with drug makers tend to prescribe more, newer and pricier 
drugs.”). 
 28. Krimsky, supra note 26, at 119. 
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require pharmaceutical companies to disclose gifts over $25 in value.29 When these 
measures were not enough, Congress enacted the federal Sunshine Act as § 6002 of 
The Affordable Care Act.30 The supposed purpose of this provision was to make 
the relationship between Big Pharma and physicians more transparent so that pa-
tients could make informed decisions about their healthcare.31 The Act did not pro-
hibit Big Pharma from having any contact or association with physicians, but it did 
seek to give their relationship some boundaries, and for good cause.32 
A study conducted by York University in 2008 revealed that Big Pharma spent 
an estimated $57.5 billion on marketing drugs in 2004, almost twice what it spent 
on research and development ($31.5 billion).33 The medical industry spends a great 
deal on marketing to physicians directly, with the majority of the “physician-fo-
cused marketing budget” spent on “detailing.”34 Detailing is when “pharmaceutical 
representatives talk directly to physicians to ‘promote and market their companies’ 
drugs.’”35 Yet, despite this emphasis on targeted marketing, many doctors still claim 
to be “immune” from any influences on their prescription habits.36 Interestingly 
enough, these same physicians believe that their colleagues are not immune from 
the influential effect of similar gifts.37 
Several studies have shown that even a relatively small gift can influence the 
recipient’s behavior. One such study, released in the Journal of the American Med-
ical Association (“JAMA”), used both industry payment data from the federal Open 
Payments Program and prescribing data for individual physicians from Medicare 
Part D to determine what influences doctors’ prescription habits.38 The study found 
that there was an association between industry-sponsored meals and an “increased 
rate of prescribing the promoted brand-name medication relative to alternatives 
within the drug class.”39 In addition, it revealed that the meals did not need to be 
lavish affairs, and concluded that “even payments of less than $20 are associated 
with different prescribing patterns.”40 Those responsible for conducting the study 
were careful to note however, that this conclusion only proves association, not cau-
sation.41 But, as Dr. Peter Lurie, deputy director of Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group, stated in his testimony during a Congressional hearing on the issue, “it 
seems unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would be catering to the culinary 
                                                          
 29. Erin Mansfield, Vermont to Become First State to Require Drug Price Transparency, VTDIGGER 
(June 3, 2016), https://vtdigger.org/2016/06/03/vermont-to-become-first-state-to-require-drug-price-
transparency/#.WhjxZFWnHIU. 
 30. Stamatoglou, supra note 2, at 976. 
 31. Id. at 977. 
 32. Id. 
 33. YORK UNIV., Big Pharma Spends More on Advertising Than Research and Development, Study 
Finds, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 7, 2008), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm. 
 34. Stamatoglou, supra note 2, at 970. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Edward C. Halperin, Paul Hutchinson & Robert C. Barrier, Jr., A Population-Based Study of The 
Prevalence and Influence of Gifts to Radiation Oncologists from Pharmaceutical Companies and Med-
ical Equipment Manufacturers, 59 INT’L J. RADIATION ONCOLOGY BIOLOGY PHYSICS 1477, 1482 
(2004). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Colette DeJong et al., Pharmaceutical Industry–Sponsored Meals and Physician Prescribing Pat-
terns for Medicare Beneficiaries, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1114, 1115 (2016). 
 39. Id. at 1121. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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and travel preferences of doctors if they didn’t think that they were getting some 
bang for the buck.”42 
Indeed, the “detailing” that pharmaceutical representatives do is far more tar-
geted than many physicians may know or understand. For instance, in addition to 
training representatives in marketing skills and techniques, Big Pharma spends over 
$20 million a year “purchasing data on individual physicians’ prescription habits to 
ensure that detailers can tailor their techniques to physicians’ specific prescription 
habits.”43 In 2012 alone, Big Pharma spent $89.5 billion on detailing,44 which ac-
counted for “60% of the global sales and marketing spending” that year.45 There-
fore, pharmaceutical representatives are well-trained in how to pitch their drugs to 
both physicians in general, and specific physicians. Being the subject of targeted 
marketing could influence almost anyone, and the data from various studies sup-
ports the conclusion that physicians are not immune to these effects. 
The New England Journal of Medicine conducted a national survey in 2007 
where researchers found that out of 3,167 physicians, 94% reported some type of 
“relationship” with the pharmaceutical industry.46 Broken down, most of the inter-
actions between physicians and Big Pharma involved either receiving drug samples 
from Big Pharma representatives (78%),47 or receiving free food while at work 
(83%).48 Others involved reimbursements for the costs of attending continuing med-
ical education meetings (26%),49 and some received payments for consulting, giv-
ing lectures, or enrolling patients in clinical trials (28% total).50 Individually, these 
figures may not appear substantial, but the effect of this “relationship” on a physi-
cian’s prescribing habits does create a cause for concern. 
One of the tactics Big Pharma uses to promote their drugs is to provide free 
samples to physicians for their patients. This tactic is wildly successful, which is 
why drug manufacturers spent $16.4 billion on doling out drug samples in 2003 
alone.51 It allows representatives to “influence physicians to dispense or prescribe 
drugs that differ from their preferred drug choice.”52 Although the drugs are initially 
free to use, patients tend to stay with a particular brand even after their samples run 
out.53 In addition, these drugs cost the patient more than if they had started off with 
the equally effective generic option from the beginning. One study found that the 
out-of-pocket expenses for a patient who never received a drug sample were $178 
                                                          
 42. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing 
Before the Spec. Comm. On Aging, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) (statement of Dr. Peter Lurie). 
 43. Stamatoglou, supra note 2, at 971. 
 44. George A. Chressanthis et al., Determinants of Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Access Lim-
its to Physicians, 14 J. MED. MKT. 220, 224 (2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1742, 1742 (2007). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Prescription Drug Trends, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 2004), https://faculty.mis-
souri.edu/~glaserr/current_news/Prescription-Drug-Trends.pdf. 
 52. Lisa D. Chew et al., A Physician Survey of the Effect of Drug Sample Availability on Physicians’ 
Behavior, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 478, 482 (2000). 
 53. Id. 
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over a 180-day period,54 while a patient who did receive samples was out $212 after 
receiving them.55 Those who argue in favor of samples claim that it allows lower 
income patients to have access to better-quality drugs. Despite this assertion, the 
data shows that people from a higher-income bracket, or those with insurance, are 
more likely to receive free drug samples.56 
Rebates are another incentivizing tactic used to entice physicians to prescribe 
a manufacturer’s brand-name drugs over their competitors’. In 2007, the New York 
Times reported in a series of articles that the largest pharmaceutical companies were 
paying hundreds of millions of dollars through rebates to doctors across the nation 
every year in return for them giving their patients the company’s products instead 
of their competitors’.57 By reimbursing the doctors for the amount of drugs they 
prescribed, the doctors were incentivized to prescribe more expensive drugs—and 
in higher doses—than what was actually considered safe for their patients.58 But, 
by doing so, these doctors took advantage of their patients and the trust they placed 
in them to look out for their best interests. 
III. THE DISEASE  
The inherent power imbalance between the physician and patient means that 
when a conflict of interest arises, the physician controls which interest takes prece-
dent. Additionally, some government programs further provide opportunities for 
conflicts to occur. For example, under current managed health care programs, like 
Medicare, doctors are encouraged to prescribe name-brand drugs rather than 
cheaper generic alternatives and to overtreat their patients by ordering unnecessary 
tests and procedures. These practices highlight the disparate power balance between 
the parties and shows how patients themselves are viewed as a commodity. 
Recently, one researcher discovered the preference for physicians to prescribe 
Lucentis, a drug used to treat age-related macular degeneration, over Avastin, a far 
cheaper, equally effective drug that has not been equally prescribed.59 The reason 
for this preference, the researcher claims, lies in the incentive Medicare Part B cre-
ates by reimbursing the prescribing-physicians for the average price of the drug.60 
If a physician prescribes Lucentis, they receive $2,000 per dose, whereas Avastin 
will only give them $50 per dose.61 In addition to the flat rate rebate, the physicians 
also receive an additional 6% every time they use either drug when treating a patient 
for the disease.62 This is all part of the reimbursement plan contained within the                                                           
 54. G. Caleb Alexander, James Zhang & Anirban Basu, Characteristics of Patients Receiving Phar-
maceutical Samples and Association Between Sample Receipt and Out-of-Pocket Prescription Costs, 46 
MED. CARE 394, 397 (2008). 
 55. Id. at 397. 
 56. Id. at 396–97. 
 57. Berenson & Pollack, supra note 27 (noting that the doctors were working around the federal ban 
on pharmaceutical companies paying doctors to prescribe certain drugs by having them administer the 
intravenous drugs in the hospital); Harris & Roberts, supra note 27 (“Research shows that doctors who 
have close relationships with drug makers tend to prescribe more, newer and pricier drugs.”). 
 58. Berenson & Pollack, supra note 27. 
 59. Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Med-
icare, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1043, 1054 (2016). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1055–56 (noting that Lucentis profits the doctors $120 per dose versus Avastin at $3 per 
dose). 
 62. Id. at 1056. 
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federally-funded Medicare, but because “participating providers exclusively decide 
which drugs are appropriate for their patients,” not even the Department of Justice 
can “argue that these highly expensive clinical decisions are illegal, or even abu-
sive.”63 
A recent scandal in Philadelphia reveals how it is not just the Big Pharma-
physician relationship that exploits the loopholes in the current system. Investiga-
tive journalists for The Philadelphia Inquirer discovered that a local law firm spe-
cializing in workers’ compensation cases, Pond Lehocky Stern Giordano, sends cli-
ents to “preferred doctors and asks them to send those new patients to the law firm’s 
pharmacy, Workers First.”64 In turn, the Workers First pharmacy then charges em-
ployers or their insurance companies for the workers’ pain medicine, which is often 
“unproven and exorbitantly priced pain creams,” with some creams costing well 
over $4,000 per tube.65 In addition, some of the doctors referred to by Pond Lehocky 
are part-owners of Workers First, the pharmacy where patients are directed to pick 
up their prescriptions.66 This means that the physicians make money from both 
treating their patients and prescribing the prescriptions,67 all without disclosing their 
interest in the pharmacy or their arrangement with the attorneys. Likewise, the at-
torneys are not required to report their relationship with the doctors either, as they 
are not “applicable manufacturers” under the Act because they do not manufacture 
products covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP.68 
Liberty Mutual Insurance filed a suit against several of the doctors involved in 
the Pond Lehocky case, claiming that their relationship with the law firm was illegal 
and that they had grossly overcharged their patients for medication.69 But, while the 
physicians’ actions are likely illegal under the federal Stark Law, those same actions 
may qualify for an exception, such as fair market value compensation.70 Therefore, 
not only could it be perfectly legal for the attorneys to pay the physicians to send 
their patients to the pharmacy, but neither party would have to inform patients of 
the potential conflict of interest. Patients should be privy to this information; Fran-
cis Elliot, a client of Pond Lehocky, found out about the situation and stated, “I 
don’t know what’s going on,” but “I don’t want to be a part of something unethi-
cal.”71 
The symptoms of a compromised medical industry were supposed to be cured 
by the Sunshine Act,72 but there are still lingering signs of the disease. Big Pharma 
is not alone in taking advantage of the loopholes left by the Act and other laws; 
doctors and other interested parties have too, as seen in the Philadelphia physicians’ 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 1059. 
 64. William Bender, ‘Talk About an Unholy Alliance’: Lawyers, Doctors and Pharmacies, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/workers-comp-insurance-pennsylva-
nia-pond-lehocky-referrals-20170922.html [hereinafter Talk About an Unholy Alliance]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(e)(2), (4) (2010). 
 69. William Bender, Philly-Area Doctors, Pharmacists Named in $4.7 Million Pain Cream Lawsuit, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/doctors-pharmacists-com-
pound-pain-cream-costly-lawsuit-20170929.html. 
 70. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(l) (2017). 
 71. Talk About an Unholy Alliance, supra note 64. 
 72. Paul D. Thacker, Don’t Rewrite History: ‘Sunshine’ Law was Meant to Protect Docs from Undue 
Influence, STAT (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/10/sunshine-act-revise-history/. 
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case. Moreover, not only are physicians exempt from reporting any conflicts of in-
terest, but they can contest inaccuracies in the published data, and delay reporting 
of potential conflicts.73 Requiring physicians to disclose such information them-
selves through the Open Payments database could be one method of treatment for 
the problem. Further measures are warranted, however, to cure the disease. One 
such cure would be the direct disclosure of potential conflicts of interest to the pa-
tient to ensure that the patient’s interests are put first, as they should be. Neverthe-
less, the best solution to limit exposure is to ban these transfers of value between 
physicians and the pharmaceutical companies. 
IV. TREATMENT 
A. Federal Acts 
Big Pharma’s ever-increasing influence over the prescribing habits of physi-
cians prompted the enactment of several so-called “Sunshine” laws to force the de-
tails of the relationship out into the light. The hope was that by doing so, patients 
could make informed decisions, and the medical industry would be cleansed of any 
improprieties within the relatively unregulated physician-pharma relationship.74 
While ideal in theory, in practice it all depends on whether the patients are aware 
that there is a website that publishes the disclosures. It further depends on their 
willingness to look up their doctors and hospitals, and then on the ability of the 
patients to fully understand the implications of the disclosed information. 
In many respects, the Act has been an abject failure. Even assuming that pa-
tients are aware that the website exists and take the time to research their physicians, 
the website does not provide context surrounding the reported transactions.75 In ad-
dition, the effectiveness of the Act also depends on the Open Payments website 
being able to publish the information in the first place. As mentioned before, phy-
sicians can contest the information to be published, and a large portion (one-third) 
of the information released in the first yearly report was withheld because of such 
contestations.76 This is not to say that those responsible for reporting (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)), should not correct improperly reported 
data, but it does highlight one difficulty in providing patients access to necessary 
information. That is, the database is supposed to be searchable, “clear[,] and under-
standable,”77 but a series of handicaps has plagued it since its conception. 
The first issue with the government database is that while it reports the names 
of the parties, the types of payments, and the amounts paid, it does not report the 
context surrounding the payment.78 For instance, a search for “Dr. Patrick Morgan” 
                                                          
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(c)(C)(ix). 
 74. Letter from Sen. Charles “Chuck” E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, to 
Jacob Lew, Chief of Staff to the President of the U.S. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.medicalimag-
ing.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013-01-22-CEG-to-J-Lew-Sunshine.pdf. 
 75. Jon Tripp, 4 Things to Think About When Reviewing Open Payments Data (Hint: Context is Key), 
MEDCITY NEWS (June 25, 2015, 3:30 PM), https://medcitynews.com/2015/06/open-payments-data/. 
 76. Charles Ornstein, Feds Withholding Data on Physician Open Payment System, J. MED. (Aug. 15, 
2014), https://www.ncnp.org/journal-of-medicine/1429-feds-withholding-data-on-physician-open-pay-
ment-system.html. 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(c)(C)(i). 
 78. Tripp, supra note 75. 
9
Tiller: Getting Their Fix: Doctor's Dependency on Big Pharma
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
Iss. 2] Tiller: Getting Their Fix 501 
reveals that a physician in Tennessee received a “gift” of $18.00 from Intuitive Sur-
gical Inc.79 The database describes “gift” as a “general category, which will often 
include anything provided to a physician or teaching hospital that does not fit into 
another category.”80 Although many people might not consider a single ambiguous 
payment of $18.00 as warranting concern, the use of such basic categories makes it 
difficult for patients to fully understand the true nature of the physician’s relation-
ship with the disclosing companies. Additionally, as the study published in JAMA 
noted, even small gifts of $20 can influence a physician’s prescription habits.81 
Thus, patients are unable to make informed decisions even if they do take the time 
to look up the data. 
In addition, CMS officials have issued warnings about how to interpret the in-
formation released through Open Payments. Shantanu Agrawal, the former deputy 
administrator for CMS, stated that the government would not “draw conclusions 
about the disclosed payments,” and “cautioned” the public not to do so either be-
cause “[f]inancial ties and relationships between medical manufacturers and health 
care providers do not necessarily signal wrongdoing.”82 Moreover, the “[O]pen 
[P]ayments program does not identify which financial relationships are beneficial 
and which could cause conflicts of interest.”83 Therefore, if those in charge of the 
disclosure database are uncertain as to the true value of the information, it is under-
standable that patients would be as well. Whether or not this information has been 
correctly utilized, however, does not mean that it can never be used for its intended 
purpose. It only requires some additional steps be taken. 
Even still, the forced direct disclosure of all possible conflicts of interest to a 
physician’s patients may not solve the problem of financial conflicts completely. 
The disclosure of this information will have little to no effect if the patients them-
selves refuse to act on it or fail to realize its true significance. Some conflicts, of 
course, once revealed, would likely prompt patients to refuse a service or drug (such 
as the Philadelphia law firm/physician/pharmacy ring), but others may not be 
viewed as problematic. Some studies have shown that when conflict of interest in-
formation is disclosed—such as in clinical trial testing—the participants fail to per-
ceive a conflict.84 They may even believe that if a physician has invested in the 
company, it signals his or her confidence in the product or device, thus lending the 
study or drug some credibility in the participants’ and patients’ eyes.85 
After two years of disclosures, it appears that patients might not benefit a great 
deal from the data released by CMS. Many patients simply may not want to take 
the time to research their doctors, a reaction that is supported by a study released in 
2006 that investigated research participants’ views on the financial interests of med-
ical researchers.86 Out of the surveyed pool of participants, the majority “wanted to 
                                                          
 79. Patrick L Morgan, OPENPAYMENTSDATA.CMS.GOV, https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/physi-
cian/192349/payment-information (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 80. Id. 
 81. DeJong, supra note 38, at 1114–22 
 82. Peter Frost et al., Obamacare Sunshine Act Sheds Light on $3.5B Paid to Doctors, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
1, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-sunshine-act-1001-biz-20141001-story.html. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Kevin P. Weinfurt, Ph.D., et al., Disclosure of Financial Relationships to Participants in Clinical 
Research, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 916, 917 (2009). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Christine Grady et al., The Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know about 
Investigator Financial Interests, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 597 (2006). 
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receive information about investigator financial interests.”87 However, “while rec-
ognizing the value of transparency and having ‘all the cards on the table,’ only a 
minority thought such financial information would influence their decisions about 
research participation.”88 Moreover, the participants indicated that even if medical 
researchers did disclose their financial interests, it would not affect the participants’ 
decision to take part in the study either “because it did not matter to them or was 
perceived as a burden that they did not want to have to deal with.”89 
The forced disclosure of conflict of interest information may not prompt the 
hoped-for response from all patients, but that does not mean that the information 
should not be disclosed in the first place. Allowing some physicians to hide their 
questionable activities behind the blanket of protection provided by the Act inhibits 
patients’ abilities to make informed decisions. If transparency is the goal, then it 
should not matter if every patient uses the information to make more informed de-
cisions, so long as the opportunity to do so exists. 
B. State Acts 
Although the federal Sunshine Act applies throughout the country, a few states 
have joined the cause and passed their own medical industry transparency laws. In 
Missouri, a bill was introduced in February 2017 which “proposed that it become 
unlawful for any drug (not device) manufacturer or distributor to offer or give any 
gift of value to a practitioner.”90 The Bill has not gained much traction since it was 
proposed,91 but its proposal warrants attention because it indicates the federal Act 
is not satisfactory. 
In fact, Missouri is not the only state that seems to feel the federal Sunshine 
Act is insufficient. Maine also introduced legislation that would “curtail gifts, free 
food, and speaking/consulting payments from drug companies to Maine physi-
cians.”92 The Bill was introduced by state representative Scott Hamann, who was 
prompted by the recent problems in Maine with opioid addiction and the increase 
in pharmaceutical companies’ influence over the doctors who prescribe them.93 The 
Bill passed the Legislature, with some amendments to include various exemptions 
(like meals, education materials, and prescription drug samples),94 and was enacted 
without the Governor’s signature on June 28, 2017.95 Two other state legislatures, 
New Jersey and California, proposed limitations on promotional payments in 2018, 
but they are also subject to exemptions, which includes honoraria as well as meals—
                                                          
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Thomas Sullivan, Maine and Missouri Propose Legislation Restricting Industry and Physician 
Interactions, POL’Y & MED., http://www.policymed.com/2017/06/maine-and-missouri-propose-legisla-
tion-restricting-industry-and-physician-interactions.html (last updated May 4, 2018). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Joe Lawlor, Even Amid Crisis, Opioid Makers Plied Doctors with Perks, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, http://www.pressherald.com/2016/12/25/even-amid-crisis-opioid-makers-plied-doctors-with-
perks/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2017). 
 94. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13759.2(A) (2017). 
 95. Summary of LD 911, STATE OF ME. LEG., http://legislature.maine.gov/LawMakerWeb/sum-
mary.asp?ID=280063851 (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
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as long as they do not exceed $250 per person annually.96 It is clear from these 
legislative proposals that the states are not completely confident in the ability of the 
federal Act to deal with conflicts of interest in the medical field. It is also clear, 
however, that the state provisions, as they currently stand, may not be an effective 
cure either. 
One glaring example of how little effect the federal Act, or any state-enacted 
“Sunshine” provision, has had is in a recent exposé by CNN concerning Nuedexta, 
a “drug approved to treat a disorder marked by sudden and uncontrollable laughing 
or crying—known as pseudobulbar affect, or PBA.”97 Instead, prescriptions of this 
one pill alone generated Avanir Pharmaceuticals hundreds of millions of dollars a 
year by directly marketing the drug to physicians and psychiatrists whose patients 
are nursing home residents with dementia or Alzheimer’s, even if the drug was “un-
necessary or even unsafe” for them.98 The drug has not been extensively studied in 
elderly patients (some have called it an “uncontrolled experiment”), but the one 
study conducted revealed that patients who took the drug suffered from falls at dou-
ble the rate than patients not taking the drug.99 
It is not Big Pharma alone that should be blamed for dangerous prescriptions; 
the doctors receiving payments from companies in exchange for prescribing drugs 
or inducing others to do so should shoulder their portion of the blame as well. Using 
information gathered through the Open Payments website, CNN reported that 
“[b]etween 2013 and 2016, Avanir and its parent company, Otsuka, paid doctors 
nearly $14 million for Nuedexta-related consulting, promotional speaking and other 
services.”100 In addition, CNN found that of the claims filed through Medicare in 
2015, almost half “came from doctors who had received money or other perks from 
the company (ranging from a few dollars’ worth of food or drink to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in direct payments).”101 One doctor highlighted in the article, 
Dr. Romeo Isidro, prescribed the drug to his patients with dementia in nursing 
homes while receiving money from Avanir as a speaker—which amounted to more 
than $500,000 in payments, travel, and meals over the course of three years.102 Once 
the daughter of one of his patients found out Dr. Isidro was receiving money from 
the drug manufacturer, she cut ties with both him and the nursing home.103 
While the CNN exposé was made possible through data gathered from the 
Open Payments website, it makes it clear that the loopholes created by the Act and 
various other laws are still open to exploitation. Had Dr. Isidro been compelled to 
disclose his connection to the drug company before he made the prescription, he, 
and doctors like him, might not have been able to dispense drugs to people who do 
not need them, and may even be harmed by them. The patients, or their loved ones, 
could make more informed decisions for their care and not be subjected to the 
whims of doctors who diagnose based on the interests of their pocket book, rather 
than the interests of their patient. 
                                                          
 96. Marc Iskowitz, Limits on Pharma Payments to Doctors Back on Policy Menu, MED. MARKETING 
& MEDIA (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.mmm-online.com/legalregulatory/limits-on-pharma-payments-to-
doctors-back-on-policy-menu/article/706001/. 
 97. Ellis & Hicken, supra note 8. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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V. FOREIGN TREATMENTS 
One, possibly unintended, effect of the federal Sunshine Act was to prompt 
other countries to pass physician payment disclosure laws of their own. Of course, 
independent forces may have prompted these laws, but several of the foreign acts 
were not implemented until after the United States passed the Act.104 While many 
countries already regulated interactions between physicians and pharmaceutical 
companies, those regulations appeared ineffective, perhaps because the industry-
wide measures were often voluntary and had little to no adverse consequences 
should the companies not adhere to the guidelines.105 The new regulatory measures 
warrant inspection, but their long-term effectiveness has yet to be proven. 
European countries developed their own regulations for handling the Big 
Pharma-physician industry relationship. For instance, in 2010, Denmark passed a 
law requiring healthcare providers (called HPC’s, i.e. physicians) to report transac-
tions, ownership interests, or other “affiliations” with drug or medical device com-
panies to the Danish Health Protection Agency or National Board of Health.106 In 
addition to physicians reporting their interactions with Big Pharma, the pharmaceu-
tical companies must also make their own reports detailing the entities or individu-
als with whom they associate.107 
France added a provision to its own disclosure law—the Loi Bertrand Act—to 
prohibit gifts and require Big Pharma companies to report “agreements with and 
benefits provided to physicians, nurses, healthcare facilities, and even students of 
health professions.”108 That data is later published on a free public-access web-
site.109 “Benefits” that must be reported are those worth $10 or more, as well as 
anything related to “clinical trials, scientific or medical seminars, travel and hospi-
tality costs, and consultant and speaking agreements.”110 Physicians are not required 
to report, and detailed product information is also not required.111 One interesting 
component of the provision is that all contracts between drug companies and doc-
tors must be approved in advance by a professional supervisory body for doctors 
and pharmacists.112 The French Act has been subject to criticism, with some claim-
ing that the burden of reporting this information is too high,113 and others stating 
that the Loi Bertrand Act itself is open to interpretation, making enforcement diffi-
cult.114 Regardless, it is a step in the right direction. 
                                                          
 104. Moya, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing the French efforts at reform); Aditi Tandon, Pharmas ‘Brib-
ing’ Docs to Face Drug Sale Ban, INDIA TRIB., http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/pharmas-brib-
ing-docs-to-face-drug-sale-ban/441207.html (last updated July 24, 2017, 1:42 AM) (focusing on India’s 
efforts to regulate the Big Pharm-physician relationship). 
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 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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As for an industry-wide European regulation, there have been some new re-
quirements implemented, but they are limited in scope. For instance, the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) recently es-
tablished a new “Disclosure Code.”115 The code requires each of the EFPIA’s 34 
national member associations, such as the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry, as well as its 40 member companies to report all “Transfers of Value to 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) and healthcare organizations (HCOs).”116 The code 
does not require, however, the disclosure of “[m]eals and drinks, Medical Samples, 
Transfers of Value that are part of the ordinary course purchase and sales of medic-
inal products,”117 or “Transfers of Value related to over-the-counter medicines.”118 
There are then some transfers of value that will go unreported that can still influence 
prescription patterns, which are left for individual countries to cover in their own 
regulations. 
       Beyond Europe, many countries have yet to implement a plan to address issues 
related to conflicts of interest. For instance, Canada does not have a national Sun-
shine Act equivalent, but recent issues with opioid prescriptions within the coun-
try’s medical community prompted a general plea for the creation of something like 
the United States Act.119 In May 2017, when the new national standards for pre-
scribing opioids were published in Canada, it came to light that one-third of the 
people involved in drafting the guidelines had financial ties to the pharmaceutical 
industry.120 The conflicts were only revealed because the university in charge of the 
new guidelines released a conflicts-of-interest disclosure on its website after they 
were published, prompting the Canadian federal government to launch an investi-
gation into the guidelines.121 Sensing the direction the healthcare disclosure move-
ment is headed, ten Big Pharma companies voluntarily released information about 
their dealings with Canadian doctors on their own websites.122 
India’s Department of Pharmaceuticals recently drafted the Essential Com-
modities (Control of Unethical Practices in Marketing of Drugs) Order 2017, which 
was meant to inhibit bribery of physicians by pharmaceutical companies.123 Another 
code, previously passed in 2015, was voluntary, and therefore did little to curb cor-
ruption.124 As V.K. Subburaj, Secretary of the Department of Pharmaceuticals for 
India, stated, “we found it very difficult to enforce it as a voluntary code. Hence, 
                                                          
 115. European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries & Associations, EFPIA HCP/HCO Disclosure 
Code, (June 6, 2014), https://efpia.eu/media/25837/efpia-disclosure-code.pdf 
 116. Id. 
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the government is planning to make it compulsory.”125 The new code, however, has 
faced significant opposition from the pharmaceutical company industry and was 
blocked by the country’s Law Ministry, who asserted that it could not be “passed 
under the current legal framework.”126 
While the exact effect these bills and acts will have on the industry remains 
unclear, they warrant attention. Despite the seeming ineffectiveness of some of 
these measures (perhaps because of their voluntary nature and lack of adverse con-
sequences should the companies not adhere to the guidelines), other countries’ at-
tempts to establish regulatory oversight over Big Pharma and physicians are worth 
monitoring. This highlights the fact that this is not a U.S. specific disease but one 
infecting a large portion of the world, and by keeping track of which treatments turn 
out to be the most effective, a cure might be found. 
VI. THE CURE 
While various solutions, like medical journals and professional societies spon-
soring CME events instead of Big Pharma, have been recommended to deal with 
some of the problems,127 the only real “cure” is enacting a complete ban on certain 
transfers of value between physicians and pharmaceutical and device manufactur-
ers. A limited ban on certain items or transfers of value might provide a temporary 
solution, but it will not cure the disease. Providing federal funding for research fa-
cilities and studies could be a legitimate solution if not for the fact that each phar-
maceutical company already funds their own studies and hires researchers who un-
doubtedly feel pressured to slant their findings favorably towards the sponsoring 
company. But, banning select items will not eliminate a physician’s incentive to 
prescribe one drug or device over the others. Big Pharma, and even “Little Pharma,” 
can find ways around such restrictions, as it has been shown. Therefore, a total ban 
on some transactions is the only solution strong enough to ensure that all symptoms 
of the disease are eradicated. 
One other possible solution would be to require that all physicians disclose any 
interest that relates to the treatment they prescribe directly to the patient. This would 
allow the patient to make an informed decision concerning their healthcare and 
could deter physicians from forming relationships with Big Pharma if mandatory 
disclosure is required. The downside is that not all patients would view the relation-
ship as problematic or a sign of a conflict of interest.128 In addition, the form of the 
disclosure itself would have to be regulated since the physician would be the one 
relaying the information. If left up to each individual physician, the disclosure might 
take many forms, and the conflict of interest could lead them to downplay the 
amount or level of their involvement. 
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Total bans on some items—like gifts, trips, and meals—makes sense, as they 
have no legitimate alternative purpose, especially in the quantities currently dis-
pensed. Physicians are more than capable of purchasing their own lunch and dinner 
every day, as well as any expenses incurred for CME seminars. Items that directly 
benefit the patient seem to cloud the issue, and free drug samples are meant to en-
tice. This is simply a way Big Pharma can incentivize physicians to prescribe new 
and expensive drugs in the hopes of getting the patients familiar with them, which 
will hopefully increase sales. That is hardly a compelling reason to continue the 
practice, and patients will be better off overall if their physicians make decisions 
based on whether the drug is in the best interest of the patient, rather than if it is 
free. Patients have enough concerns to deal with; they do not need the additional 
concern of if they will recover in spite of their physician’s treatment. 
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